

*Usage*

**SECRET**

AIR

MGL-A-5342

Chief, Foreign Division M

23 February 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

USAGE / UJ DRUID Trip to Rome

Reference: MOK-W-7579, MGL-A-5179, MGL-A-5211, MGL-A-5342

1. The following general account of the USAGE trip to Rome and conversations with UJ DRUID and EB-201 was given to C on 18 February. The time-table for the trip is pouches separately as MGL-A-5342.

2. Upon arrival in Rome, USAGE initially contacted EB-201 and very generally attempted to determine the present situation of the UJ DRUID group. He was told that the present main effort of the UJ DRUID group is to influence and indoctrinate their younger members in the views of UJ DRUID. EB-201 stated that the group was experiencing extreme difficulties placing these younger members in a position where they could continue their studies and still eat. Eighteen young members of the group have developed tuberculosis, and inasmuch as the present Italian law prohibits refugees from establishing businesses, their only financial support is limited to a monthly IRO payment of 10,000 lire per person. EB-201 told USAGE that, in view of this, UJ DRUID regarded financial support and educational possibilities for these younger members as the major factor in all-out collaboration.

3. USAGE met UJ DRUID later the same evening, and a long conversation ensued. UJ DRUID, who is described by USAGE as a man of great patience, stated that he was most reluctant to establish an intelligence network among his followers heretofore or at the present time, preferring to wait until the international situation crystallized. He feared that any premature action which might compromise his followers in Russia would result in the decimation of his people to the extent where they would be as ineffective in time of emergency as, he claims, are SIMA's now. UJ DRUID stated that, on the other hand, due to the precarious financial status of his youthful following in the West, he had rejected all previous intelligence offers only with the greatest self-restraint. UJ DRUID claimed that he had declined numerous collaboration offers by the French, the British, and the Italians.

DIST:

1 - TDM

1 - CGS

1 - [ ]

2 - File

**COPY**

**SECRET**

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE	10-1-51
FILE	10-1-51

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2005

UJ DRUID further stated that he had previous U.S. offers, but would not elaborate. He insists that he has no present intelligence ties of any type.

4. UJ DRUID stated that the Italian police attempted to put him into difficulties at the beginning of 1950 in order to force his collaboration. UJ DRUID took this opportunity to write to both de GASPERI and SCHEIBER reiterating his anti-communist background and program and insisting on untrammeled political refuge. Since that time, claims UJ DRUID, he has had no more difficulties with the police, although both the police and the Italian IS try to enlist his aid from time to time, unsuccessfully.

5. UJ DRUID claims to maintain a friendly personal connection with General RADESCU, and states that General PETRESCU has written him a letter favoring the idea of his intelligence collaboration. Supported by PETRESCU also, OFRAN has approached him on numerous occasions, and has offered him for collaboration free education for a number of his younger followers in France. UJ DRUID has accepted none of these offers, despite the responsibility he claims he feels to his followers.

6. USAGE says he believes UJ DRUID to be materially disinterested, and convinced of final future victory for his moral-political movement both in Rumania and the Balkans. He definitely balks at exposing his followers in Rumania.

7. USAGE argued that the martyr attitude, which UJ DRUID apparently was taking, was accomplishing little useful for his followers, and if he persisted in doing nothing except wait, attrition would eventually reduce his following to a point of ineffectiveness.

8. UJ DRUID finally agreed to collaborate with USAGE, as USAGE states, "for positive experience in the past and a moral debt he felt to USAGE for aid in escaping from Rumania", provided USAG had a top U.S. connection whom USAGE considered reliable. UJ DRUID said he would agree to a step-by-step development of intelligence operations in Rumania and the Balkans, but in the event such activity were blown through our fault, he would order immediate and permanent deactivation. UJ DRUID proposed that for the time being he would activate one regional operation in the Dobruja. (This is the original USAGE proposal contained in MGL-A-5214.) UJ DRUID himself did not wish to participate in the financial discussions, which he directed USAGE to take up with EB-201. - Brigin.

9. During the course of the conversation UJ DRUID stated that he believed that considerable importance should be attached to the active resistance of his followers in Rumania in the future. He intimated that, dependent upon his ability to satisfy the U.S. in the intelligence line, he would desire to discuss the possibilities of providing weapons and supplies to an active resistance within Rumania, at the time such resistance became necessary or desirable.

Brigin  
OPC  
CIA

2/5

**SECRET**

10. The details of the trip of BB-100 to BB-1000 were discussed and UJ DRUID was told to await a decision.

11. BB-201 gave USACE the names and details concerning the UJ DRUID collaborators in the West and promised full operational details, including names of persons in Rumania immediately upon return of the first courier.

12. [ ] Comments: All the above probably represent the outlook and views of UJ DRUID slanted somewhat, perhaps, by USACE, who, beyond all doubt, wants to keep a finger in the pie. There is always the possibility that the reluctance of UJ DRUID to activate an intelligence net stems from inability, rather than the altruistic motive of keeping his people under cover. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that the French seem to be definitely interested, as does the possible British agent, LEU, and as yet, at least here, there have been no indications that UJ DRUID has taken their bait. The ability of USACE to get a bite may possibly be due to a feeling of personal obligation on the part of UJ DRUID to USACE, who, incidentally, is very persuasive, or it may be only that UJ DRUID has not yet been approached by a responsible U.S. agency. The complex problem merits study.

13. For USACE's reaction to the counter-proposals in para. 10, MOL-A-5211, see MOL-A-5375.

SECRET

32-6-7-835